



















Resumo	Infelizmente,	 as	 falhas	 nas	 barragens	 de	 rejeitos	 com	 consequências	catastróficas	 não	 são	 novidade	 em	 nosso	 país.	 No	 entanto,	 o	 Direito	 dos	Desastres,	 um	 ramo	 da	 prática	 jurídica	 que	 destaca	 o	 papel	 do	 sistema	jurídico	na	redução	das	vulnerabilidades	subjacentes	a	esses	eventos,	ainda	não	 é	 amplamente	 conhecida.	 O	 direito	 desempenha	 um	 papel	 central	 no	gerenciamento	 de	 eventos	 catastróficos.	 Um	 desastre	 é	 o	 resultado	 de	vulnerabilidades	 sociais	 e	 físicas.	 Nos	 desastres	 causados	 por	 atividades	econômicas	 (desastres	 antropogênicos	 ou	 tecnológicos),	 há	 uma	 ênfase	adicional	 na	 vulnerabilidade	 tecnológica	 como	 chave	 para	 identificar	assimetrias	e	falhas	no	fluxo	de	informações	fundamentais	para	a	ocorrência	do	 desastre.	 Com	 base	 nessas	 premissas	 e	 numa	 metodologia	 de	reconstrução	narrativa,	este	artigo	visa	esclarecer	o	papel	da	lei	em	eventos	como	esse,	a	fim	de	aprender	com	os	ciclos	destrutivos	e	impedir	novos.	





Abstract	Tailings	 dam	 failures	 with	 catastrophic	 consequences	 are,	 unfortunately,	nothing	new	in	our	country.	And	yet,	Disaster	Law,	a	branch	of	legal	practice	that	 highlights	 the	 role	 of	 the	 juridical	 system	 in	 reducing	 the	 underlying	vulnerabilities	of	these	events,	is	still	not	widely	known.	Law	plays	a	central	role	 in	 the	 management	 of	 catastrophic	 events.	 A	 disaster	 is	 the	 result	 of	social	and	physical	vulnerabilities.	In	disasters	caused	by	economic	activities	(anthropogenic	 or	 technological	 disasters),	 there	 is	 an	 added	 emphasis	 on	technological	 vulnerability	 as	 a	 key	 to	 identify	 asymmetries	 and	 failures	 in	the	 flow	 of	 information	 fundamental	 for	 the	 occurrence	 of	 the	 disaster.	Based	 on	 these	 premises	 and	 on	 a	 narrative	 reconstruction	 methodology,	this	article	aims	to	clarify	 the	role	of	 law	in	events	such	as	 this,	 in	order	to	learn	from	destructive	cycles	and	prevent	new	ones.			
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take	 years.	 Out	 of	 the	 effervescence	 of	 information	 stemming	 from	 the	 collective	 grief	 and	dismay,	 this	 article	 presents	 essential	 reflections	 informed	 by	 Disaster	 Law,	 with	 the	 sole	purpose	 of	 providing	 legal	 rationality	 and	 stability	 to	 the	 chaos	 that	 a	 disaster	 such	 as	 this	brings	 about,	 and	 thereby	 ensuring	 that	 legal	 work	 such	 as	 this	 may	 in	 some	 way	 reduce	vulnerabilities	 and	 celebrate	 the	 resilience	of	 communities	 in	 the	 future.	Even	 if	 an	 averted	disaster	is	not	accounted	for	and	will	therefore	always	remain	unknown,	that	will	always	be	the	ultimate	goal	of	Disaster	Law	practitioners	around	the	world.			
The	event		 On	 January	25,	2019,	 the	 tailings	dam	of	 the	Córrego	do	Feijão	Mine	collapsed	at	12:28	p.m.	It	was	operated	by	the	mining	company	Mineradora	Vale	and	located	in	the	municipality	of	 Brumadinho,	 in	 the	 state	 of	 Minas	 Gerais.	 The	 dam	 contained	 approximately	 12	million	cubic	 meters	 of	 iron	 ore	 tailings	 and	 had	 been	 inactive	 for	 approximately	 3	 years.	 It	 was	licensed	for	decommissioning	in	2018.	It	was	a	so-called	upstream	dam,	the	most	frequently	used	construction	methodology	for	tailings	dams,	but	also	the	one	with	the	highest	number	of	accidents.		Most	of	the	victims	were	company	employees	and	outsourced	workers	who	were	either	in	the	administrative	building	or	at	the	company	canteen,	both	of	which	were	located	directly	on	 the	 pathway	 of	 the	 spill,	 less	 than	 a	 mile	 from	 the	 dam.	 That	 distance	 was	 covered	 in	approximately	 two	minutes.	 (Rossi,	 2019b)	 Seventeen	 days	 after	 the	 event,	 the	 number	 of	confirmed	 deaths	 stood	 at	 165,	with	 another	 160	 reported	missing,	 138	 homeless	 and	 two	casualties	still	hospitalized.	(Souto,	2019)	In	terms	of	environmental	 impacts,	 the	area	affected	by	the	rupture	of	 the	dam	covered	269,84	hectares.	The	preliminary	analysis	carried	out	by	the	National	Center	 for	Monitoring	and	 Environmental	 Information	 (Cenima)	 from	 the	 federal	 environmental	 agency,	 IBAMA,	“indicates	 that	 the	mining	waste	has	devastated	133,27	hectares	of	native	vegetation	of	 the	Atlantic	 Forest	 and	 70,65	 hectares	 of	 Permanent	 Preservation	 Areas	 (PPA)	 along	 the	waterways	 affected	 by	 the	mining	waste.”3	 The	waste	 has	 already	 traveled	 down	 98	 km	 of	water	resources	(Rodrigues,	2019),	obviously	causing	severe	environmental	impacts	in	them.	A	 similar	 disaster	 had	 occurred	 three	 years	 earlier.	 On	 November	 5,	 2015,	 what	 was	known	until	then	as	“the	worst	environmental	disaster	in	Brazil”	(Phillips,	2016;	Branco	and	Ponso,	 2017)	 took	 place	 in	 the	 same	 mining	 region	 of	 Brazil.	 The	 Mariana	 disaster	 also	resulted	from	the	rupture	of	a	tailings	dam	(called	Fundão),	although	this	one	was	used	for	the	production	 of	 iron	 ore	 pellets	 and	 operated	 by	 Samarco	 (a	 company	 owned	 by	 two	 other	mining	 companies,	 the	 Brazilian	 Vale	 and	 Anglo-Australian	 BHP	 Billiton).	 That	 rupture	released	about	60	million	cubic	meters	of	iron	ore	tailings	into	the	Rio	Doce,	one	of	the	most	important	 rivers	 in	 the	 country,	 which	 in	 approximately	 two	 weeks	 reached	 the	 Atlantic	Ocean.	 The	 destructive	 path	 of	 the	 slurry	 extended	 over	 879	 kilometers.	 Many	 cities	 were	strongly	 impacted	 along	 its	 track,	 and	 the	 tailings	 caused	 extensive	 environmental	 damage,	while	 also	 displacing	 600	people	 and	 causing	 a	 human	death	 toll	 of	 19.4	 Another	 similarity	between	Mariana	and	Brumadinho:	both	were	upstream	tailings	dams.			
																																								 																				3	 Available	 at	 http://www.ibama.gov.br/noticias/730-2019/1881-rompimento-de-barragem-da-vale-em-brumadinho-mg-destruiu-269-84-hectares	Accessed	on	02.08.2019.		4	For	a	more	detailed	approach	to	this	case	and	the	failures	in	risk	management,	see	Carvalho	(2019c,	p.	281-300).	
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What	sort	of	disaster	is	Brumadinho?		Disasters	 are	 classified5	 by	 triangulating	 factors	 such	 as	 (i)	 causes	 (physical6,	anthropogenic	or	mixed);	 ii)	consequences	(lives,	properties	and	environment);	 iii)	systemic	stability	 (whether	 an	 emergency	 situation	 or	 a	 state	 of	 public	 calamity	 is	 declared,	 for	instance).	(Carvalho	e	Damacena,	2013)	Failures	of	iron	ore	tailings	dams,	such	as	Mariana	in	2015	and	now	Brumadinho	(2019),	clearly	fall	into	the	category	of	anthropogenic	disasters,	or	events	stemming	directly	from	an	economic	activity	or	a	human	cause,	a	man-made	disaster.	In	terms	of	consequences,	such	a	disaster	can	be	classified	as	a	socio-environmental	disaster,	given	the	loss	of	lives	and	significant	environmental	impacts.	The	normative	principle	adopted	in	 Brazil	 is	 based	 on	 Decree	 7.257/10,	 which,	 in	 item	 II,	 of	 article	 2,	 characterizes	 such	 a	disaster	 as	 a	 “result	 of	 adverse	 natural	 or	 man-made	 events	 on	 a	 vulnerable	 ecosystem,	causing	human,	material	or	environmental	damage	and	consequent	economic	and	social	loss.”	As	 we	 have	 said	 before,	 given	 their	 intensity,	 disasters	 are	 phenomena	 with	 severe	associated	 consequences	 that	 also	 prevent	 –	 either	 partially	 or	 completely	 –	 the	 affected	community	 from	 reacting	 to	 and	 responding	 to	 their	 impact.	 The	 attribute	 'environmental'	added	to	the	term	disaster	is	directly	related	to	the	severity	of	an	event	for	the	environment.	In	the	case	of	Brumadinho,	the	disaster	is	undeniably	anthropogenic	in	terms	of	its	cause,	and	socio-environmental	in	terms	of	its	consequences.		
Technological	vulnerability		 For	 centuries,	 disasters	were	 treated	 as	 events	 resulting	 from	 divine	 fury,	 and	 as	 such	evidently	 beyond	 the	 control	 of	 society	 and,	 consequently,	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 law.	Today,	however,	 informed	 by	 insights	 from	 the	 Social	 Theory	 of	 Disasters,	 they	 are	more	 properly	seen	as	social,	or	at	most	hybrid,	or	physical	(“natural”)	phenomena.	Hence,	for	a	given	event	to	have	the	dimension	of	a	disaster,	there	will	often	be	some	social	factors	that	contribute	to	its	occurrence	or	aggravation.	In	disasters,	these	underlying	factors	are	the	vulnerability	and	resilience	of	a	given	community.	The	vulnerabilities	that	pervade	disasters	can	be	physical	or	social.	(Farber	et	al.,	2010;	Verchick,	2010b;	Verchick,	2012c;	Verchick,	2019a)	Anthropogenic	 disasters	 are	 more	 often	 associated	 to	 social	 vulnerabilities,	 more	specifically	 the	 type	 of	 vulnerability	 we	 have	 come	 to	 call	 technological	 vulnerability.	 This	category	 is	 directly	 related	 to	 breakdowns	 and	 communication	 gaps	 in	 the	 flow	 of	information.	 In	other	words,	anthropogenic	disasters	are	strongly	correlated	 to	problems	 in	the	exchange	of	information	or	knowledge	that	function	as	preponderant	factors	in	causing	or	escalating	such	events.	Such	problems	interfere	with	the	diagnosis	of	risks	and	consequently	impair	 the	 adoption	 of	 preventive	 and	mitigating	measures,	 or	 adequate	 safety	 precautions	after	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 event.	 These	 information	 flows	 are	 basic	 prerequisites	 for	 any	 risk	management	process	and	for	taking	preventive	or	precautionary	measures.		For	 this	 reason,	 the	 environmental	 licensing	 process	 is	 the	 appropriate	 administrative	procedure	 for	 the	environmental	 risk	assessment	and	management	 (Carvalho,	2015a,	p.	65-78)	of	 these	structures,	which	should	 include	a	series	of	documents,	such	as	the	Dam	Safety	Plan	(Article	6,	II,	Law	12.334/2010),	and,	if	applicable,	the	EIA/RIMA	(Environmental	Impact	
																																								 																				5	For	a	more	detailed	approach	on	developing	a	legal	sense	of	disaster,	see	Farber	et	al.,	2010	and	Sugerman	(2006,	p.	01-09).	6	Physical	disasters	are	often	referred	to	as	“natural”,	but	here	we	prefer	this	term,	because	even	climatic	and	physical	disasters	can	have	some	human	contribution,	even	if	indirectly	and	of	complex	causality.	In	this	sense,	we	can	talk	about	extreme	climate	events	 that	 are	 aggravated	 by	 anthropogenic	 climate	 change.	 In	 order	 to	 avoid	 longer	 digressions	 and	 the	 complexity	 of	 this	debate	here,	we	have	opted	for	this	conceptual	designation.		
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Assessment)	 for	 activities	 with	 the	 potential	 for	 causing	 significant	 environmental	degradation.	The	Dam	Safety	Plan	 is	an	 instrument	 from	the	National	Policy	on	Dam	Safety,	and	Article	8	of	 that	 legislation	 lays	out	 the	minimum	information	 it	 should	contain.	Among	the	requirements,	there	is	the	need	for	periodic	safety	inspections	(IX),	for	example.		The	frequency	of	these	inspections,	as	well	as	the	qualification	of	the	technician	in	charge,	the	minimum	content	and	 the	detail	 level	of	 the	 safety	plans	are	 to	be	 set	by	 the	 inspection	




instruments	 that	 specifically	 contemplate	 a	 disaster	 scenario	 (e.g.,	 a	 dam	 safety	 plan,	 an	emergency	plan,	the	periodic	reviews)	will	inevitably	be	a	recipe	for	disasters.	Another	example	can	be	found	in	the	track	record	of	accidents	involving	iron	ore	tailings	dams.	According	to	previous	case	studies,	regular	periodic	 inspections	and	close	monitoring	are	essential	for	the	safety	of	such	structures.	However,	in	spite	of	being	apparently	effective,	inspections	 can	prove	quite	 inadequate.	As	 reported	 in	a	documented	 reviewing	many	such	accidents:	 “Unless	 the	 inspector	has	a	good	knowledge	of	 the	behavior	of	 tailings	dams	and	has	at	his	disposal	instrumentation	to	reveal	to	him	the	conditions	within	the	body	of	the	dam	and	 its	 foundations,	 such	 inspection	may	 be	 not	 only	 useless	 but	 also	 highly	 dangerous	 by	giving	to	management	a	false	sense	of	security.”13		Therefore,	 reducing	 vulnerabilities	 becomes	 a	 key	 role	 for	 law	 in	 dealing	 with	catastrophic	risk	events.	It	is	the	legal	system	that	must	answer	the	right	questions	and	decide	what	 information	 is	 to	 be	 produced;	 who	 is	 entitled	 to	 the	 information	 inherent	 to	 such	situations;	who	is	responsible	for	producing	such	information;	what	legal	measures	have	to	be	taken	on	the	basis	of	the	existing	information.14	Reducing	technological	vulnerabilities	is	thus	directly	 related	 to	 the	 production	 and	 transmission	 of	 adequate	 information	 to	 allow	 for	efficient	risk	management,	supervision	by	the	competent	bodies	and	appropriate	emergency	responses.	 Accurate	 information	 also	 allows	 for	 more	 technically	 appropriate	 decision	making,	 both	 in	 the	 public	 and	 private	 sectors,	 as	well	 as	 greater	mobilization	 of	 potential	stakeholders.	 Risk	 management	 is	 crucially	 dependent	 on	 the	 existence	 of	 adequate	information.	 The	 same	 applies	 to	 the	 adequacy	 of	 emergency	 responses,	 compensation	arrangements	 and,	 ultimately,	 to	 the	 reconstruction	 of	 the	 environment	 and	 the	 affected	community	itself.	In	the	Córrego	do	Feijão	dam	failure	(B1),	in	addition	to	the	physical	vulnerabilities	that	were	made	evident	by	 the	 rupture	 itself,	 other	aspects	 contributed	 to	 the	disaster:	not	only	were	there	social	vulnerabilities,	such	as	 the	technological	vulnerabilities	already	addressed	above,	but	 also	a	workplace	 vulnerability	which	placed	 the	 company's	 employees	directly	 in	the	path	of	 the	 catastrophe.	And	as	 if	 that	were	not	enough,	 the	 city's	urban	planning	–	 the	very	 instrument	 used	 for	 zoning	 and	 implementing	 urban	 policies	 –	 allowed	 for	 urban	expansion	and	development	along	the	path	which	the	mining	waste	slurry	would	eventually	take.		
The	circularity	of	risk	and	increased	risk	awareness		
I.	Prevention	and	Mitigation:	Disaster	law	is	closely	related	to	risk	management.	In	view	of	the	magnitude	of	these	events,	the	saying	“better	safe	than	sorry”	is	at	the	core	of	this	legal	branch.	 The	 reason	 lies	 precisely	 in	 the	 magnitude	 of	 the	 risks	 involved.	 Even	 when	 the	likelihood	 of	 a	 disaster	 is	 low,	 as	 was	 indicated	 by	 the	 technical	 documents	 for	 the	Brumadinho	dam,	 its	 ranking	 as	 a	 high	magnitude	 event	 should	 always	 generate	 a	 detailed	process	 for	 managing	 the	 associated	 risks.	 Disaster	 law	 identifies	 its	 structures	 and	 roles	within	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 disaster	 cycle,	 i.e.:	 prevention	 and	 mitigation;	 emergency	response;	 compensation	 to	 victims	 and	 the	 environment;	 reconstruction	 of	 the	 affected	community	and	environment	(green	and	grey	infrastructure).	All	of	these	are	intertwined	in	a	
																																								 																				13	This	was	the	case	with	the	accident	at	the	Placer	Bay	mine	in	Surigao	del	Norte,	Philippines.	This	was	a	deactivated	mine	that	breached	when	mining	waste	rocks	were	being	dumped	onto	the	 inactive	 tailings	 for	which	the	dam	had	originally	been	built.	(ICOLD/UNEP,	2001)	14	For	a	discussion	on	the	“right	to	know”	and	environmental	disasters,	see	generally	Jassanof	(1994).	
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circular	 pattern	 by	 the	 necessary	 risk	 management	 implemented	 at	 each	 of	 these	 stages.	(Farber	et	al.,	2010;	Farber,	2012b)15	It	should	be	underscored	that	since	an	ore	 tailings	dam	is	a	structure	with	potential	 for	large-scale	 damage,	 its	 management	 should	 follow	 the	 logic	 demonstrated	 above,	 with	 an	emphasis	 on	 circular	 risk	 management	 at	 all	 stages	 of	 the	 event.	 As	 is	 well	 known,	 the	“[f]ailure	of	the	retaining	dam	can	release	liquefied	tailings	that	can	travel	for	great	distances,	destroying	everything	 in	 its	path	because	of	 its	greater	weight.	Water	will	 flow	through	and	around	 buildings,	 but	 liquefied	 tailings	 can	 destroy	 the	 structures.”	 (ICOLD/UNEP,	 2001,	 p.	12)	Any	 risk	 management	 process	 involves	 evaluating	 and	 multiplying	 the	 factors	 of	probability	(the	quantification	of	the	likelihood	of	a	given	event)	and	magnitude	(the	severity	of	 its	 potential	 impacts).	 Law	 12.334/10,	which	 outlines	 the	 national	 policy	 on	 dam	 safety,	makes	reference	to	these	elements	by	means	of	the	concepts	“risk	category”,	 for	probability,	and	 “potential	 damage	 associated	 with	 the	 dam”,	 for	 magnitude	 (article	 7).	 Both	 can	 be	classified	 into	 low,	 medium	 and	 high	 potential.	 The	 degree	 of	 likelihood	 will	 depend	 on	technical	characteristics,	the	structure’s	state	of	conservation	and	its	compliance	with	the	dam	safety	 plan	 (paragraph	 one),	 while	 the	 classification	 into	 a	 category	 of	 potential	 damage	associated	with	the	dam	is	made	according	to	the	extent	of	potential	loss	of	human	life,	as	well	as	 the	 economic,	 social	 and	 environmental	 impacts	 resulting	 from	 the	 dam's	 collapse	(paragraph	two).		For	a	dam,	the	evaluation	of	probability	refers	to	the	quantitative	analysis	of	its	potential	for	 structural	 failure.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 dam	 in	 Brumadinho,	 as	 reported	 in	 the	 press,	 the	probability	was	considered	 low.	For	an	accurate	technical	analysis,	 the	dam	structures	must	meet	 the	 stability	 factors	 specified	 in	 technical	 standards.	 As	 well-observed	 by	 legal	commentators,	 the	 national	 policy	 on	 dam	 safety	 places	 great	 emphasis	 on	 the	 principle	 of	prevention	(known	and	 foreseeable	risks)16,	without	necessarily	excluding	 the	evaluation	of	uncertain	or	non-quantifiable	risks	(as	foreseen	in	the	National	Policy	of	Protection	and	Civil	Defense,	 Law	 12.608/12).17	 Clearly,	 foreseeable	 risks	 must	 necessarily	 be	 addressed	effectively	 and	 by	means	 of	 reasonable	measures	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 catastrophic	 damage	from	 occurring.	 The	 risks	 posed	 by	 the	 present	 case	 clearly	 appear	 to	 be	 quantifiable	 (or	predictable	by	the	state-of-the-art).	However,	even	non-quantifiable	and	uncertain	risks	with	potential	 for	catastrophic	or	 irreversible	 impacts	call	 for	decisions	with	an	 “adequate	safety	margin”.	(Sunstein,	2005)	This	should	apply	even	in	such	cases	where	the	probability	is	extremely	low	or	cannot	be	demonstrated	 in	 a	 quantifiable	 way.	 Thus,	 “[w]hen	 risks	 have	 extremely	 bad	 worst-case	scenarios,	 it	makes	sense	 to	pay	special	attention	 to	 those	risks,	even	 if	 they	are	unlikely	 to	come	to	fruition	and	even	if	existing	information	does	not	enable	regulators	to	make	a	reliable	judgment	about	the	probability	that	they	will	occur.”	(Sunstein,	2005,	p.	04-05)	




As	 regards	 magnitude,	 any	 evaluation	 process	 and	 subsequent	 risk	 management	 must	consider	 the	 potential	 consequences.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Brumadinho,	 the	 tailings	 dam	 held	 12	million	cubic	meters	of	 iron	ore	tailings.	Without	going	into	the	issue	of	evaluating	potential	risks	 of	 increasing	 imprecision	 or	 uncertainty	 in	 our	 specific	 case,	 those	 risks	 that	 are	foreseeable	 or	 quantifiable	 must	 necessarily	 be	 subject	 to	 reasonable	 and	 satisfactory	measures	to	avert	serious	losses.	The	goal	should	be	to	prevent	or	at	 least	mitigate	them.	In	this	sense,	what	immediately	strikes	the	observer	is	the	fact	that	the	company’s	own	facilities	were	 located	 directly	 within	 the	 impact	 area	 of	 a	 dam	 failure.	 An	 administrative	 building	(including	 the	 staff	 tasked	 with	 activating	 the	 emergency	 plan)	 and	 the	 company	 canteen,	both	of	which	 located	 just	below	the	dam,	draw	attention	to	a	noticeable	 lack	of	predictable	(quantifiable)	 risk	 management.	 Consequently,	 regardless	 of	 the	 formal	 existence	 of	 an	environmental	permit,	a	dam	safety	plan	and	an	emergency	plan,	not	one	of	these	instruments	was	able	to	generate	awareness	for	the	imminent	risk	of	those	structures.	The	same	diagnosis	was	made	after	an	analysis	of	the	Fundão	dam	rupture	in	Mariana	in	2015.	(Carvalho,	2019c,	p.	299-300)	In	addition,	it	is	worth	noting	that	the	scenarios	outlined	both	in	the	emergency	plans	and	the	risk	assessment	were	not	enough	to	prevent	urban	development	in	the	area	that	would	be	affected	by	the	dam	tailings	 in	the	event	of	a	rupture.	Again,	 these	are	 foreseeable	risks	and	should	be	 addressed	 in	order	 to	 avoid	or	 at	 least	mitigate	 the	 risks	of	 “potential	 associated	damage”.			
II.	Emergency	Response:	Some	observations	are	fundamental	in	relation	to	the	necessary	risk	 management	 that	 should	 inform	 the	 emergency	 response	 stage,	 which	 consists	 of	
preparedness	 (drafting	 contingency	 plans	 and	 training	 the	 people	 potentially	 involved)	 and	the	actual	response.		The	warning	stage,	in	which	a	descriptive	statement	of	the	event	is	made	(where	possible	before	 it	 takes	 place,	 so	 that	 the	 population	 and	 the	 organizations	 can	 take	 appropriate	countermeasures),	should	be	followed	by	the	emergency	response	plan	to	the	disaster.	This	is	when	 the	 actions	 foreseen	 in	 the	 preparedness	 stage	 are	 carried	 out,	 through	 coordinated	integration	of	 the	competent	agencies	and	the	enactment	of	 the	emergency	and	contingency	plans.	(Carvalho,	2015a,	p.	116-121)		Narratives	 of	 the	 disaster	 corroborate	 that	 capacity	 building	 processes	 and	 simulations	were	 periodically	 conducted.	 (Rossi,	 2019b)	 However,	 even	 when	 it	 proves	 impossible	 to	prevent	 a	 disaster,	 an	 obvious	 measure	 to	 mitigate	 its	 magnitude	 (potential	 associated	damage)	is	to	clear	employees	and	the	community	at	large	from	the	impact	zone	and	the	path	that	the	tailings	slurry	will	take.	Yet	company	employees	were	only	1.4	kilometers	away	and	were	hit	within	approximately	2	minutes	of	the	breach.		Furthermore,	the	emergency	plan,	which	is	essential	for	mitigating	any	disaster,	was	not	implemented	 immediately,	 as	 the	personnel	 responsible	 for	 this	 task	 (initiate	protocols	and	notify	 the	authorities)	was	 inside	 the	administrative	building	on	the	very	path	of	 the	slurry.	Given	 that	 the	emergency	plan	 is	designed	 in	advance	 for	 the	event	of	 a	 failure,	how	was	 it	possible	 that	 those	 responsible	 for	 its	 deployment	were	 in	 the	 immediate	 impact	 zone?	 To	make	 matters	 worse,	 the	 alarm	 system	 was	 knocked	 out	 so	 quickly	 that	 it	 was	 not	 even	activated	to	warn	the	residents	of	the	local	community	of	Brumadinho.	(Rossi,	2019a)	The	declaration	of	a	state	of	calamity	or	an	emergency	situation	serves	both	to	trigger	and	speed	up	the	allocation	of	resources,	while	reducing	bureaucracy	for	a	series	of	measures	and	decisions.	 The	 transfer	 of	 funds	 depends	 on	 the	 declaration	 and	 recognition	 by	 the	 federal	
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government	of	an	emergency	situation18	or	a	state	of	public	calamity19.	Formal	recognition	of	the	disaster	by	the	federal	executive	branch,	for	the	purposes	of	fund	transfers	and	assistance	from	SINPDEC	(formed	by	federal	civil	defense	agencies	and	entities,	along	with	participating	civil	 defense	 agencies	 and	 entities	 from	 state	 and	municipal	 governments),	 depends	 on	 the	submission	of	a	request	from	the	executive	branch	of	the	state,	federal	district	or	municipality	affected	by	the	disaster20.	Not	 only	 did	 the	 prevention	 of	 the	 disasters	 fail,	 but	 also	 the	 emergency	 response	measures	that	could	have	mitigated	them.	The	scrutiny	of	the	rule	of	law	must	now	proceed	to	determine	the	existence	of	liabilities	(administrative,	civil	and	criminal).		
III.	 Compensatory	 and	 Reconstruction	 Stage:	Disaster	 compensation	 is	 a	 further	 step	towards	 increasing	 the	 resilience	 of	 victims,	 whether	 in	 financial	 or	 structural	 terms.	 In	addition	to	this	more	traditional	role,	this	stage	also	lends	itself	to	the	management	of	risks,	to	making	decisions	about	who	will	be	compensated,	how	much	compensation	will	be	paid,	what	accessory	measures	will	be	adopted	to	avert	new	disasters,	among	other	tasks.	There	are	four	methods	 of	 compensation	 for	 catastrophic	 events:	 private	 insurance;	 legal	 remedies	 (in	particular,	 civil	 liability);	government	assistance;	previously	existing	 legal	 funds,	or	such	set	up	on	an	ad	hoc	basis.	Regardless	 of	 future	 claims	 for	 civil	 liability	 compensation,	 the	 company	 announced	 a	registration	 process	 for	 an	 emergency	 payment	 of	 BRL	 100,000	 (about	 USD	 25,000)	 per	deceased	or	missing	family	member	to	their	respective	family	(Stochero,	2019);	BRL	50,000	for	 people	who	 had	 property	 in	 the	 affected	 area;	 and	BRL	 15,000	 for	 local	 retail	workers.	These	 amounts	 are	 cumulative.	 Funeral	 expenses	 were	 covered.	 The	 Municipality	 of	Brumadinho	was	paid	BRL	80	million	as	compensation	for	lost	revenue	due	to	the	suspension	of	the	company's	activities.	(Rodrigues,	2019)		These	 amounts	 will,	 of	 course,	 be	 deducted	 from	 possible	 civil	 liability	 rulings	 made	against	the	company.	It	should	be	remembered	that	in	the	Brazilian	legal	system,	in	cases	of	anthropogenic	 disasters	 with	 socio-environmental	 repercussions,	 strict	 liability	 applies	(article	14,	paragraph	one,	 law	6.938/81),	with	doctrine	and	court	precedents	 largely	ruling	for	the	theory	of	integral	risk	(which	does	not	admit	any	exculpatory	defenses).21	The	 federal	 government	 has	 authorized	 advance	 withdrawals	 for	 beneficiaries	 of	 cash	transfer	programs	(Bolsa	Familia).	In	addition,	affected	homeowners	will	be	eligible	to	make	withdrawals	from	their	FGTS	employee	severance	guarantee	funds,	“due	to	personal	need,	the	urgency	and	 seriousness	of	which	arises	 from	a	natural	disaster”,	 even	 though	 this	 event	 is	evidently	not	a	“natural”	disaster.		However,	 Federal	 Decree	 8.572/2015,	 specifically	 edited	 after	 the	 Mariana	 disaster	(2015),	included	among	the	situations	in	which	amounts	could	be	withdrawn	from	that	fund	the	following	cases:	“rupture	or	collapse	of	dams	that	cause	massive	movement,	with	damage	to	 residential	 units”.	 This	 normative	 act	 altered	 the	 text	 of	 the	 already	 existing	 decree	5.113/2004	 that	 regulated	 the	matter,	 and	 also	 established	 a	 ceiling	 of	 BRL	 6.220	 for	 such	
																																								 																				18	 According	 to	 article	 2,	 III,	 decree	 7.257/10,	 an	 “emergency	 situation	 [is	 an]	 abnormal	 situation	 caused	 by	 disasters	 and	resulting	in	damage	and	losses	that	entail	partial	impairment	of	responsiveness	by	public	authorities	in	the	affected	area.”	(Brasil,	2010a).	19	 According	 to	 article	 2,	 IV,	 decree	 7.257/10,	 a	 “state	 of	 public	 calamity	 [is	 an]	 abnormal	 situation	 caused	 by	 disasters	 and	resulting	in	damage	and	losses	that	entail	substantial	 impairment	of	responsiveness	by	public	authorities	 in	the	affected	area.”	(Brasil,	2010a)	20	According	to	article	7,	decree	7.257/10.		21	For	a	more	detailed	analysis	of	civil	 liability	in	cases	of	environmental	disasters	involving	both	the	private	and	public	sector,	see	Farber	(2009a).	For	a	comparative	legal	analysis,	see	Carvalho,	2015a	(p.	131-176).		
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withdrawals.	Despite	the	technical	inappropriateness	of	equating	the	failure	of	the	dam	with	a	natural	 disaster,	 this	was	made	 solely	 for	 the	purpose	of	 allowing	 the	 immediate	 release	of	funds	 for	 the	victims.	Naturally,	 the	decree	does	not	have	 the	normative	 force,	nor	even	 the	purpose	 of	 reclassifying	 or	 changing	 the	 configuration	 of	 a	 type	 of	 disaster,	 in	 this	 case,	resulting	from	the	collapse	of	a	dam.	This,	as	we	have	seen,	is	a	technological	or	anthropogenic	disaster.	It	should	be	noted	that	in	the	case	of	amounts	for	which	an	employee	holds	title,	they	are	to	be	reimbursed	by	those	who	are	eventually	held	accountable	for	the	event	in	terms	of	civil	liability.	The	 reconstruction	 stage,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 should	 not	 be	 directed	 towards	reestablishing	 the	 old	 normality	 (which	 existed	 prior	 to	 the	 event),	 forever	 unattainable	 in	light	 of	 the	 irreversibility	 and	 magnitude	 of	 a	 disaster,	 but	 rather	 to	 a	 new	 normality,	 by	reducing	that	community's	vulnerability	and	increasing	its	resilience.		
Final	considerations:	the	closing	of	the	cycle		 Employing	 an	 interdisciplinary	 legal	 approach	 (with	 contributions	 in	 particular	 from	Environmental,	Urban	Planning,	Administrative,	Criminal,	Civil,	Insurance	and	Contracts	Law),	Disaster	Law	seeks	to	address	all	stages	of	a	catastrophic	event.	It	should	be	highlighted	that	the	autonomy	of	this	legal	branch	is	consolidated	by	a	cycle	of	risk	management	that	connects	the	stages	from	prevention	through	to	reconstruction.	From	a	legal	perspective,	in	Brazil	the	autonomy	 and	 unity	 of	 this	 branch	 is	 characterized	 by	 a	 specific	 normative	 framework,	centralized	 in	 Laws	 12.340/2010	 and	 12.608/2012,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 Decree	 7.257/2010.	(Carvalho,	2015a,	p.	51-52)	Therefore,	 in	 a	 disaster	 situation,	 or	 when	 facing	 a	 potential	 disaster,	 law	 serves	 the	purpose	 of	 providing	 stability	 by	 enforcing	 normative	 standards	 prior	 to	 and	 following	 the	event,	without	overlooking	the	destructive	dynamics	of	a	catastrophe.	Law	plays	a	role	in	the	colonization	of	disasters.22	According	to	Austin	Sarat,	law	must	deal	with	disasters	along	five	dimensions,	 namely:	 (i)	 maintaining	 the	 operability	 of	 law,	 (ii)	 fighting	 lawlessness,	 (iii)	providing	 stabilisation	 and	 resettlement	 to	 the	 victims,	 (iv)	 identifying	 victims	 and	 culprits;	
(v)	reducing	future	vulnerability.	(Sarat	and	Lezaun,	2009,	p.	7)	The	 occurrence	 of	 a	 disaster	 should	 initiate	 a	 new	 learning	 cycle	 where	measures	 are	taken	 to	prevent	 future	and	potential	disasters.	To	 this	end,	a	 systemic	assessment	must	be	carried	 out	 to	 identify	what	 the	 points	 of	 failure	were	 (structural,	 regulatory,	 third	 parties,	physical	 factors,	 etc.)	 and	 which	 preventive	 measures	 are	 to	 be	 incorporated	 into	 future	events.	There	is	an	important	difference	between	misfortune	and	injustice.	Misfortune	implies	complacency	and	resignation,	whereas	injustice	calls	for	legal	liability.	It	goes	without	saying,	always	based	on	due	legal	process	and	the	rule	of	law.		
What	remains	after	a	disaster	is	to	restore	essential	public	services,	compensate	victims	and	
environmental	impacts,	seek	accountability	and,	most	importantly,	learn	(and	take	measures)	to	
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